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I. INTRODUCTION 
 This matter comes on before this Court on the appeal of 
Plaintiff-Appellant New Jersey Coalition of Automotive 
Retailers (“the Coalition”), seeking review of the District 
Court’s dismissal of its case under the New Jersey Franchise 
Practices Act (“NJFPA”) against Defendant-Appellee Mazda 
Motor of America for lack of standing in an order entered on 
July 30, 2019.  For the reasons stated below, we find that the 
District Court construed the complaint too narrowly in 
concluding that the Coalition lacked association standing, so we 
will reverse the Court’s order of July 30, 2019, and remand the 
case to the District Court for further proceedings. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
For the purposes of this opinion, we construe all facts 
alleged in the complaint as true, and in the light most favorable 
to the Coalition.  See N. Jersey Brain & Spine Ctr. v. Aetna, 
Inc., 801 F.3d 369, 371 (3d Cir. 2015).  The Coalition is a trade 
association whose members consist of franchised new car 
dealerships in New Jersey, among whom sixteen members are 
Mazda dealers.  According to the complaint, Mazda initiated an 
incentive program for its franchised dealers called the Mazda 
Brand Experience Program 2.0 (“MBEP”), which provides 
incentives, in the form of per-vehicle discounts or rebates on the 
dealers’ purchases of vehicles from Mazda, to dealers who make 
certain capital investments in their physical facilities that 
highlight their sale of Mazda vehicles, or in some instances, 
dedicate their dealerships exclusively to the sale of Mazda 
vehicles. 
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The incentives come in different tiers, with the highest 
tier available to dealers who have exclusive Mazda facilities and 
a dedicated, exclusive Mazda general manager.  Mazda gives 
lower incentives to dealers who do not employ an exclusive 
Mazda general manager and/or dealers whose dedicated 
facilities do not conform to all appearance requirements as 
defined by Mazda.  But Mazda dealers also earn incentives if 
they meet customer experience metrics.  Mazda dealers who do 
not have a dedicated facility, i.e., those dealers who sell other 
brands of vehicles as well as Mazdas, so-called “dual” dealers, 
do not receive any incentives for brand commitment. 
Although the complaint did not set forth these 
allegations, the District Court also relied on certain facts 
contained in declarations the parties made in support and in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss.  According to the Court, at 
the time of the filing of the complaint only three of the sixteen 
Mazda dealers in the Coalition qualified for the highest tier of 
incentives that we describe above, although eight others 
qualified for some tier of incentives.  N.J. Coal. of Auto. 
Retailers v. Mazda Motor of Am., No. 18-14563, 2019 WL 
3423572, at *7 (D.N.J. July 30, 2019) (“NJCOA”).  The 
complaint alleges that the MBEP creates unfair competitive 
advantages for dealers who qualify for incentives under the 
MBEP at the expense of those dealers who do not, and even 
among incentivized dealers through different tiers of incentives, 
in violation of the NJFPA.  The Coalition seeks to enjoin the 
implementation of the MBEP and to obtain declaratory relief. 
   
III. DISCUSSION 
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332, and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We review the District Court’s dismissal based on lack 
of standing de novo.  Aetna, 801 F.3d at 371. 
In dismissing the case, the District Court relied on the 
three-prong test that the Supreme Court set forth in Hunt v. 
Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 
S.Ct. 2434, 2441 (1977), to find that the Coalition lacked 
association standing to bring its lawsuit on behalf of its 
members.  See NJCOA, 2019 WL 3423572, at *3-8.  “[A]n 
association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members 
when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in 
their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane 
to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted 
nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual 
members in the lawsuit.”  Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343, 97 S.Ct. at 
2441.  The Court held that the Coalition’s complaint satisfied 
the first prong but failed the second prong of the Hunt criteria, 
thus the Court did not reach the third prong.  NJCOA, 2019 WL 
3423572, at *5-8. 
With regard to the first prong, the District Court held, 
and we agree, that it is obvious on the face of the complaint at 
least some of the Mazda dealers in the Coalition suffer 
competitive harm due to implementation of the MBEP—the 
program itself expressly discriminates among Mazda dealers.  
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2211-12 
(1975); (noting that an association “must allege that its 
members, or any one of them,” are harmed); Hosp. Council of 
W. Pa. v, City of Pittsburgh, 949 F.2d 83, 87 (3d Cir. 1991).  
When addressing the second prong, the Court held that because 
eleven of the sixteen Mazda dealers would lose the incentives 
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they currently enjoy under the MBEP, the Coalition’s lawsuit, 
which seeks to enjoin implementation of the MBEP, is in 
conflict with the interests of those dealers, who make up the 
majority of the Mazda dealers that the Coalition represents.  See 
NJCOA, 2019 WL 3423572, at *6.  Under the Court’s rationale, 
given that only five out of the sixteen Mazda dealers would 
benefit from the lawsuit, the Coalition cannot possibly be 
protecting the interests of its members.  See Contractors Ass’n 
of E. Pennsylvania, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 1260, 
1266 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that an association does not have 
standing to bring a lawsuit that is “contrary to the interests of a 
majority of [its] members”). 
We disagree.  The District Court impermissibly limited 
the Coalition’s lawsuit to a single theory of harm, one that 
arguably the complaint does not even raise.  Essentially, in the 
Court’s view, this case is about the haves versus the have nots.  
Because some of the Mazda dealers have been shut out of the 
MBEP altogether, this lawsuit is about vindicating their rights 
and bringing competitive balance back between them and the 
other dealers who do benefit from the MBEP.  Though we 
understand why the Court viewed the complaint as it did, we are 
satisfied that its reading was too narrow.  “[W]hen standing is 
challenged on the basis of the pleadings . . . we must . . . 
construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.”  
Hosp. Council, 949 F.2d at 86 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).1 
 
1 We point out that the information on which the District Court 
relied in dismissing the complaint regarding the three dealers in 
the highest tier and the eleven MBEP participants, came directly 
from Mazda in a declaration by one of its own regional 
managers.  See App. 52.   
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According to the District Court, only three of the Mazda 
dealers enjoy the highest tier of incentives.  We see no reason to 
dismiss the possibility that the eight dealers who enjoy lower 
tiers of incentives would forego such incentives in order to 
prevent the creation of three “super” dealers who clearly have a 
competitive advantage over all other Mazda dealers.  In fact, the 
very declarations on which the Court relied in granting the 
motion to dismiss suggest this view of the complaint.  Indeed, 
one of the Mazda dealers declared that it qualifies for a lower 
tier of incentives under the MBEP, but nevertheless supports the 
lawsuit.  See App. 89. 
We think it is also plausible that many of the Mazda 
dealers regard the capital investment required to participate fully 
in the MBEP as financially unjustified, but nevertheless feel 
pressured to participate due to the competitive disadvantages 
artificially created by the MBEP for non-participation or partial 
participation.  See compl. ¶ 16 (App. 32).  As Mazda points out 
in its brief, one of the dealers supporting the lawsuit had done 
just that after the District Court dismissed the case.  Appellee’s 
Br. 8 n.1.  Although Mazda highlights five dealers who had 
submitted declarations in opposition to this lawsuit, five does 
not constitute a majority of the sixteen Mazda dealers.  
Construing the complaint most favorably to the Coalition, we 
see little support for the Court’s conclusion that the Coalition is 
acting in conflict to the interests of its members.  See Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 
(2007) (“Asking for plausible grounds to infer [a claim] does 
not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage . . . .  
[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a 
savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and 
that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.”) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
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At oral argument before us, Mazda argued that the 
conflict of interest issue is a factual dispute, and the District 
Court made its ruling because the Coalition did not rebut 
Mazda’s evidence that eleven of the sixteen Mazda dealers 
enjoy some form of benefit from the MBEP.  That argument 
turns the analysis at the pleading stage on its head.  We construe 
the complaint in the light most favorable to the Coalition, and it 
is Mazda’s burden to present facts to attack the basis of 
jurisdiction pled in the complaint, which Mazda failed to do.  
See Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 349 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(“Rule 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to attack the allegations in 
the complaint and submit contrary evidence in its effort to show 
that the court lacks jurisdiction.”).  Instead, it submitted 
affidavits from only five dealers clearly showing opposition to 
the lawsuit, while asking the District Court to infer, from those 
affidavits, that six other dealers would have opposed the lawsuit 
as well, which the District Court unfortunately did.  That is not 
construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
complainant.2 
 
2 In analyzing the conflict of interest issue, the District Court 
held that “in calculating the total membership of NJ CAR for 
the purpose of determining whether the litigation runs contrary 
to the interests of the majority, it will consider the total relevant 
membership to include only Mazda dealer members.  
Accordingly, NJ CAR members that do not sell Mazda vehicles 
are not included in the calculation.”  NJCOA, 2019 WL 
3423572, at *7 n.7.  We question the validity of that holding.  
After all, even if fifteen out of the sixteen Mazda dealers might 
oppose a lawsuit of this kind due to the significant investment 
they have already made as MBEP participants, there can be no 
question that the last remaining Mazda dealer holding out would 
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In view of our analysis, we will reverse the Court’s July 
30, 2019 order dismissing the case, and remand the case to that 
Court for further proceedings.3 
 
have standing to bring a lawsuit against Mazda on its own, and 
the success of that lawsuit would harm the other fifteen dealers 
regardless of their opposition.  The germaneness prong of the 
Hunt test, therefore, is primarily concerned with the 
association’s ability to zealously advocate the claims of that one 
dealer.  432 U.S. at 343, 97 S.Ct. at 2441 (“[W]hether an 
association has standing to invoke the court’s remedial powers 
on behalf of its members depends in substantial measure on . . . 
[whether] the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of 
those members of the association actually injured.” (quoting 
Warth, 422 U.S. at 515, 95 S.Ct. at 2213)).  If the other non-
Mazda members, numbered in the hundreds, have an 
exceedingly strong interest in the success of such a lawsuit 
because, for example, they wish to prevent other manufacturers 
from implementing similar coercive programs against them, 
there should be little concern over the Coalition’s capacity to be 
a zealous advocate of that one member’s claims, even if the 
non-Mazda members may not have standing to bring a lawsuit 
on their own.  In that scenario, the opposition of the fifteen 
Mazda dealers would be immaterial, as they would constitute a 
tiny minority of the membership.  However, we need not 
squarely address the District Court’s holding here, as it erred 
even if we accept its holding as correct. 
 
3 We stress that in so ruling, we express no opinion as to the 
merits of this case.  We limit our holding to the conclusion that 
the Coalition has association standing to bring this case.  In fact, 
our opinion should not be understood as implying that the 
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complaint sufficiently has stated a valid claim under the NJFPA. 
 On remand, the District Court is free to consider any other 
arguments for dismissal that Mazda advances. 
